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Abstract
Inflation has been well contained over the last decades in most industrialized 
countries. This implies, however, that memories of high inflation are likely to fade, 
because over time larger parts of the population have never experienced high 
inflation, whereas those who have might forget. This paper tests whether memories of 
high inflation affect agents’ preferences about the importance attached to price 
stability, using a large database covering over 52,000 survey responses from 23 
countries over the years 1981-2000. It finds that memories of hyperinflation are there 
to last, whereas those of less drastic inflation experiences tend to erode after around 
10 to 15 years. The recent decline in the importance attached to price stability does 
therefore most likely reflect mitigated inflation concerns in an environment of low 
and stable inflation, but also the consequences of fading memories of high inflation. 
The longer central banks have successfully delivered price stability, the more 
important it is for them to engage in a proactive communication, especially with the 
younger generations, about the merits of low and stable inflation.  
Keywords: inflation aversion, inflation memories, hyperinflation, World Values 
Survey, inflation targeting 
JEL classification: D10, E31, E52 5
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Non-technical summary 
 
Inflation outcomes are very likely to, at least partially, reflect the preferences of societies. Without 
public support, central banks will find it much more difficult to disinflate a high inflation economy, or 
to prevent inflation from rising in the first place. The different inflation experiences across countries in 
the 1980s, for instance, have often been explained by variations in the inflation aversion of the general 
public. In that debate, references have typically been made to the German case, where allegedly public 
support for the Bundesbank’s anti-inflationary stance was high due to the German experience of 
hyperinflation in 1923. 
 
This discussion suggests that memories of high inflation are a relevant factor in shaping a society’s 
preferences. If this is the case, industrialized countries might be about to experience a reduced inflation 
aversion among their citizens, given the fact that inflation has been moderate over the recent past. Over 
time, fewer and fewer members of the societies of industrialized countries will have a vivid memory of 
the great inflation of the 1970s/1980s (and of course even more so of the hyperinflation episodes, which 
date back much longer) – either because they have not experienced it, or because they forget over time.  
 
This paper tests for the role of inflation memories in shaping the preferences of economic agents. It uses 
data obtained from the World Values Survey, covering over 52,000 responses obtained in 4 waves of 
the survey, conducted over the years 1981-2000 in 23 industrialized countries, to illustrate that over the 
more recent period, the importance attached to fighting rising prices has generally and steadily declined. 
While this could simply reflect that agents pick other priorities in times when inflation is not seen to be 
a current problem, and as such might not be indicative of a declining inflation aversion among the 
general public, the paper goes further to show that the likelihood of being concerned about rising prices 
is closely related to the extent to which an individual has already experienced high inflation. In 
particular, having lived through hyperinflation during adult lifetime implies a substantially larger 
concern about inflation, which furthermore does not tend to erode. Less drastic experiences of high 
inflation, in contrast, are found to be in agents’ minds for around 10 to 15 years, and subsequently fade. 
 
These findings have important implications for central banks. They suggest that public support for their 
mandate could possibly erode over time, due to the central banks’ own successes in taming inflation, 
thus lowering the sensitivity of the public towards rising prices. The longer central banks have 
successfully delivered price stability, the more important it is for them to engage in a pro-active 
communication, especially with the younger generations, about the merits of low and stable inflation. 
Fortunately, the findings in this paper suggest that central banks have tools at their disposal to shape 
public views about inflation, as the general public appears to be perceptive to central bank 
communication.  6
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1.  Introduction 
In democracies, agents’ preferences about policy priorities are an important input into the decision-
making process of politicians. With regard to macroeconomic policies, a society’s inflation aversion has 
often been seen as a major determinant of the design of the monetary institutions and of macroeconomic 
outcomes. For instance, the granting of independence to the Deutsche Bundesbank and the avoidance of 
the great inflation of the 1970s/1980s in Germany have often been ascribed to a high inflation aversion 
of the German society, which itself is usually assumed to have resulted from the fact that Germany had 
experienced hyperinflation in 1923 (Beyer et al. 2009, Issing 2005, Hayo 1998, Cukierman 1992).  
 
Inflation aversion is most likely not constant over time. For central banks (including the Bundesbank), 
inflation aversion as revealed from their policy conduct has been found to vary (Kuzin 2006, Cecchetti 
and Ehrmann 2002); at the same time, the preferences of society are likely not time invariant either, due 
to i) time-varying preferences of individuals, or ii) a changing composition of the population. With 
inflation having been well contained in most industrialized economies over the last decades, it is 
important to understand whether this will affect inflation aversion of individuals, and thus the evolution 
of the aggregate views about how to conduct monetary policy. With memories of high inflation fading 
(because society is composed of more agents who have never experienced high inflation themselves, 
and because agents who have experienced high inflation might start forgetting), public support for the 
pursuit of price stability might also erode. To understand the possible evolution of societal preferences 
over time, and the possibilities for a decline in inflation aversion on the background of low and stable 
inflation in most industrialized economies over a prolonged period of time, it is crucial to study the 
relevant issues at the microeconomic level. 
 
In this paper, we will use data obtained from the World Values Survey, covering over 52,000 responses 
obtained in 4 waves of the survey, conducted over the years 1981-2000 in 23 industrialized countries, to 
illustrate that over the more recent period, the importance attached to fighting rising prices has generally 
and steadily declined. While this could simply reflect that agents pick other priorities in times when 
inflation is not seen to be a current problem, and as such might not be indicative of a declining inflation 
aversion among the general public, the paper goes further to show that the likelihood of being concerned 
about rising prices is closely related to the extent to which an individual has already experienced high 
inflation. In particular, having lived through hyperinflation during adult lifetime implies a substantially 
larger concern about inflation, which furthermore does not tend to erode. Less drastic experiences of 
high inflation, in contrast, are found to be in agents’ minds for around 10 to 15 years, and subsequently 
fade. 
 
This implies that young agents in industrialized economies, by not having been exposed to spells of 
high inflation, are substantially less likely to consider the combat of inflation as a societal priority. 
These findings have important implications for central banks. They are suggestive that there is a 
possibility of an eroding support for their mandate over time, which is brought about by the central 
banks’ own success in taming inflation, thus lowering the sensitivity of the public towards rising prices. 
The longer central banks have successfully delivered price stability, the more important it is for them to 
engage in a pro-active communication, especially with the younger generations.  
 
The paper is related to various strands of the literature. In modern macroeconomic theory, the conduct 
of monetary policy is typically analyzed under the assumption that central banks set monetary policy in 
relation to a social loss function, with inflation aversion affecting the weight given to inflation 
stabilization (Woodford 2003). However, given that these models are typically based on the assumption 
of representative agents, heterogeneous preferences are not generally taken into account. Aggregation 
issues have received somewhat more attention in the definition of the appropriate inflation measure that 
a central bank should target. Mankiw and Reis (2003) model this problem, using representative 
consumers, yet heterogeneous sectors that can differ with regard to their size, cyclical sensitivity, price 
rigidities or magnitude of sectoral shocks. The assumption of a representative consumer is of course 
questionable, and becomes important in the discussion of plutocratic versus democratic price indices 
(Prais 1959). Both approaches compute the consumer price index as an aggregation of household price 7
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indices, but they use different weights: in the former, the weight of each household is determined by its 
expenditure share, whereas for the latter each household receives the same weight. 
 
Another strand of the literature studies the determinants of inflation aversion of economic agents. Shiller 
(1997) analyses the results of a survey about why people dislike inflation, and discovers differences in 
opinions across countries, as well as between generations. With regard to intergenerational differences, 
he finds (p. 59) that “in answering questions about what is really important and what our national 
leaders really ought to pay attention to”, people are influenced by their previous experiences of inflation 
and possible undesired effects of high inflation periods. In line with this, it has consistently been found 
that inflation affects self-reported well-being of economic agents (Alesina et al. 2004, Di Tella et al. 
2003, Wolfers 2003). Also in that regard, earlier experience matters: Blanchflower (2007) shows that 
having experienced episodes of high inflation over their adult lifetime lowers the levels of happiness of 
economic agents, while Lombardelli and Saleheen (2003) as well as Malmendier and Nagel (2009) find 
that inflation expectations vary positively with inflation experience. Finally, Malmendier and Nagel 
(2007) show that having experienced high inflation leads households to invest less in bonds. 
 
The notion that societal preferences have important repercussions on economic outcomes is also dealt 
with in the recent literature on culture in economics. Tabellini (2009), for instance, provides compelling 
evidence that there is a causal link between culture and economic development. Guiso et al. (2006) 
provide an overview of the relevant contributions to this literature, and remark that very little is known 
at the current stage about the factors that shape culture and make it persist. The concept of culture in this 
literature relates to values that are transmitted from generation to generation, and is therefore broader 
than the idea of inflation aversion in this paper (given that we do not analyze the intergenerational 
patterns); at the same time, an understanding of the determinants and the persistence of inflation 
aversion for a given individual is a first step in studying the determinants of cultural developments. A 
closely related paper to ours is Hayo (1998), who finds – using the same survey question as we do, yet 
based on the Eurobarometer survey – evidence for a “stability culture”, whereby survey respondents in 
low inflation countries tend to be more sensitive to increasing inflation rates than people in higher-
inflation countries. 
 
The present paper attempts to contribute to these lines of research. It describes the data and the 
methodology underlying our empirical analysis in Section 2. Section 3 provides the empirical results. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. The data and the econometric model 
As mentioned above, we will test for the role of inflation experience in assessing the importance to fight 
rising prices using data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS consists of representative 
national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the general public in a large number of countries. It is 
conducted by a network of social scientists at leading universities all around world, coordinated by a 
central body, the World Values Survey Association
1. The WVS builds on the European Values Surveys, 
first carried out in 1981. The subsequent waves, 1989-1993, 1994-1998 and 1999-2000 covered overall 
some 80 countries. For each country there are interviews with a representative national sample
2 of about 
1000 people. The data are weighted so as to adjust for the survey design within the country and also 
weighted when pooled together so as to equalize the contribution of each country/wave in the sample. 
 
                                                 
1 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. Data for the 2005 wave has just recently been made available publicly 
for a subset of the countries analyzed in this paper. We have not updated the dataset, first due to the partial 
coverage (currently, only data for 13 out of our 23 countries are available), and second because the inclusion of 
data after the euro cash changeover might complicate the analysis due to possible gaps between actual and 
perceived inflation (see, e.g., European Central Bank 2005). 
2 Some cases where the samples are non-representative are described in Stevenson and Wolfers (2008). Our data 
do not include any non-representative samples. 8
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The data, apart from the questions on various values and beliefs, contain information on 
sociodemographic characteristics of the individuals, such as age, gender, marital status, educational 
level, employment status, income. Numerous studies have been based on the World Values Survey, 
exploring a wealth of topics, covering for instance the change of cultural values of societies in the globe, 
as for example, Inglehart (1997), or the relationship of income and health, as in Jen et al (2009). While 
the survey is mainly of a sociological and political nature, it has recently been increasingly studied also 
by the economics profession. For instance, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) and Layard (2008) have 
analyzed the relationship of happiness and economic growth; Guiso et al. (2003) use it to investigate the 
effect of religion on economic attitudes, and Georgarakos and Pasini (2009) employ the data on trust 
contained in the WVS to understand determinants of stock market participation.  
 
Among the various belief questions, the survey contains a block of questions regarding respondents’ 
views about what should be the most important policy priorities in the country of residence for the next 
10 years. In that context, respondents are asked to indicate which of the following goals is considered to 
be the most important: 
x Maintaining order in the nation 
x Giving people more say in important government decisions 
x Fighting rising prices 
x Protecting freedom of speech 
 
In a subsequent question, the respondent has the possibility to nominate a second priority from the same 
choice set. We will base our empirical analysis on these questions. Their exact wording entails a number 
of advantages and disadvantages for our study, several of which have already been highlighted by Hayo 
(1998). A first issue relates to the fact that respondents need to pick from a set of choices, rather than 
indicating the importance they attach to price stability as such. A disadvantage in that regard is that we 
do not observe respondents’ priority sets fully – whether the fight against inflation takes the third or 
fourth rank is not observed. Furthermore, the alternatives that are on offer might not imply serious 
trade-offs (as would be the case if respondents needed to give priority to fighting inflation over reducing 
unemployment, for instance). At the same time, the advantage of the phrasing of this question is that it 
does force a choice. If respondents were asked to assign importance to various alternative goals 
independently, they might as well give all of them a priority status, a possibility that is excluded here. 
3 
 
A second issue to note is that current events or developments can “crowd out” the other priorities. A 
drop in the share of respondents who pick the fight against inflation as priority could therefore arise 
either because they see inflation as less of a problem, or alternatively because another option of the list 
has gained in importance. What is important for our empirical analysis is therefore to properly control 
for current developments (both in inflation as well as in factors that might affect the likelihood to opt for 
another goal). Only controlling for such effects will allow us to treat the answers to this question as a 
proxy for the inflation aversion of individuals. 
 
The dataset we use covers over 52,000 answers to these questions, in 4 waves of the survey conducted 
over the years 1981-2000 in 23 industrialized countries. Table 1 provides an overview of the coverage. 
We restricted the sample to industrialized countries, as a pooling of their data is only admissible if it is 
plausible to assume that the coefficients to be estimated are not too different between countries. For a 
relatively homogeneous group, this assumption seems more plausible. In any case, we will test for the 
homogeneity assumption by further splitting the sample of countries to those belonging to the European 
Union and all others. Another advantage of restricting the sample to industrialized countries is that all of 
these are long-established democracies, such that we would expect the political situation in each country 
to remain broadly stable over time compared to developing or emerging economies. While this cannot 
resolve the problem that concurrent political events could lead to shifts of respondents’ priorities over 
time, it should at least make substantial shifts less likely. 
 
                                                 
3 Please note that non-response for this question is very limited. Only 0.25% (2%) of respondents do not provide a 
first (second) priority. 9
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In most countries, we have data for 2 or 3 of the survey waves. In Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand only one wave is available, whereas all four waves are contained 
for Germany, Spain and Japan. Some country waves are not included in our sample, namely if our 
dependent or explanatory variables have not been asked in that particular wave. This is, for instance, the 
case for the wave conducted in 1982 in the United States, such that our dataset comprises only three US 
waves, starting in 1990. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
A first look at the importance attached to price stability is provided in Table 2. A first thing to note is 
that fighting rising prices is on average not the most important concern of respondents. A random 
allocation would lead to a 25% share of respondents picking each choice. Instead, this number stands at 
only 15% for inflation as the first priority. Furthermore, inflation concerns have clearly abated when 
compared to the 1980s – inflation was chosen as first or second choice by 50% of respondents in the 
first wave, but only by 30% and 35% in the third and fourth waves, respectively. This implies a slight 
pickup in the most recent wave, albeit to levels substantially lower than those observed in the first wave. 
Furthermore, such a reconsideration of inflation concerns has not occurred in all countries alike. In the 
United States, for instance, numbers have steadily declined, from 43% of respondents giving inflation 
either first or second priority status in 1990, to a very low – also by international comparison – 27% in 
1999. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Another interesting feature is the breakdown by cohorts according to the year of birth. The more 
recently born cohorts show a much reduced inclination to put the fight against inflation on top of their 
list, especially when compared to the cohort born in 1925 or before.
4 Importantly, splits by age rather 
than by year of birth show much less of a declining pattern. The difference in results arises because the 
survey waves spread over 20 years, from 1981 to 2000, such that over time, individuals get assigned to 
different age groups. This suggests that (beyond a possible age factor), lifetime experience of an 
individual can possibly be important in the way this question gets answered. 
 
Responses are clearly linked to the level of inflation prevailing at the time of the survey. Figure 1 plots 
the share of respondents mentioning fighting rising prices as first or second priority in each country and 
wave against contemporaneous inflation. A positive relationship is clearly discernible, although with a 
substantial variation, suggesting that other factors are also important in shaping these responses. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In order to model how the importance to price stability relates to current inflation and an individual’s 
inflation experience, it is crucial to properly control for other possible determinants. In particular, given 
that the respondents are not asked to rank the importance of fighting rising prices on a given scale, but 
rather need to decide whether or not to prioritize inflation in a list of alternative choices, it is important 
to simultaneously control for possible determinants of the alternative choices. We do so in the following 
way: 
 
The survey contains a large number of other questions, some of which could potentially be interesting 
for our purposes. In particular, we will employ the data on gender, on education, on income and on the 
age of the respondent to cover the most important demographic characteristics. In addition, we know 
from the survey whether the respondent is the “chief wage earner in the house”, how often she discusses 
                                                 
4 E.g., the share of respondents giving priority to fighting rising prices is statistically significantly larger for the 
cohort born prior to 1926 than for the cohort born after 1970 at the 1% level, for all waves jointly as well as for 
every wave individually, for first or second priority (with only one exception, namely fighting rising prices as 
second priority in the 1994-1999 wave, where the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level). 10
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political matters with friends, and finally the respondents’ self-positioning on the political scale from 
right to left. 
 
The demographic controls are important, given earlier evidence that females tend to have higher 
inflation perceptions and inflation expectations than men, and that age, income as well as education are 
important in that regard (Bryan and Venkatu 2001, Lombardelli and Saleheen 2003, Christensen et al. 
2006). Income is also known to affect the importance attached to combating inflation: Easterly and 
Fischer (2001) have shown that the poor are more likely to mention inflation as a national concern in a 
similar survey covering 38 countries. Furthermore, each of the demographic factors might also affect 
the importance attached to any of the other choices in the survey.  
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for each of our explanatory variables. Our control for gender is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one for females. As Table 3 shows, 49% of all respondents are female. 
We measure age at the time of the survey, aggregated in age groups (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 
65+), and differentiate three levels of education, low (elementary school or below), middle (completed 
secondary school), upper (with some university education, with or without degree)
5. With regard to 
income, our variable considers 9 relative income levels. Respondents were asked to assess their income 
on a ten band scale of income relative to the respondent’s national norm. We further collapsed the two 
upper deciles as for some countries and waves they contained very few responses. To account for the 
fact that income is measured in relative terms to the current national income distribution, we allow for 
country-specific slope coefficients in our regression models. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
The other three variables obtained from the WVS are less standard, and were chosen in the light of the 
alternative choices available to respondents. All other answer categories relate to political concepts, 
such that it is important to control for the importance that the individual attaches to political questions 
(proxied by the frequency of political discussions), where we would expect a more politically active 
person to be less likely to pick inflation as a priority. An individual’s political views might be important 
for which of the three political priorities a respondent chooses. Accordingly, we enter the self-
positioning of the individual on the political spectrum as a possible control variable (see also van 
Lelyveld 1999). Last, we also control for whether or not a respondent is the main wage earner in the 
household, as this might affect the importance attached to price stability. 
 
These variables are measured as follows. The importance of political discussions is defined on a range 
from 1 (frequent discussions) to 3 (the respondent never discusses political matters with friends), such 
that a higher value for this variable denotes less political interest. The self-positioning of respondents in 
the political spectrum is performed on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates the left, and 10 the right 
end of the spectrum.  
 
An important variable for our hypotheses relates to the inflation experience that respondents have 
gained prior to the survey. We confine the analysis to inflation experience during an individual’s adult 
lifetime (i.e., as of the age of 18), but results are robust to further expanding this horizon, e.g. to the 
experience as of the age of 12. In particular, we are interested in the maximum annual inflation rate that 
the respondent has experienced up until the survey. This variable is therefore specific to all individuals 
of a given year of birth in a given country, for a given survey wave. To construct such a variable, long 
historical data series of inflation are required. We have availed ourselves of Global Financial Data
6, a 
                                                 
5 For some countries and waves only ‘age when completed education’ was recorded instead of ‘educational level’. 
Since the relationship between the two was not entirely clear-cut (for example, there were many cases with 
recorded ‘age when completed education’ above 14 or even 18 and yet ‘lower’ educational level’), we imputed 
educational level based on ‘age completed education’ and employment status. The imputation models were 
estimated from the country waves where both education variables were observed. Our final results are stable 
whether we use the imputed educational level or the ‘age when completed education’. 
6 https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/  11
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database which contains historical and financial data for about 200 countries (some going back to the 
thirteenth century). A caveat is in order here. We base respondents’ inflation experience on the national 
historical data of the country where the interview took place. In case of immigrants, this might, 
however, not reflect the actual inflation experience. For that reason, we have eliminated all cases where 
the respondent has indicated that the country of birth is not the one of the interview. This can only 
mitigate the issue, though, for a number of reasons. First, the relevant question on the country of birth is 
not available for all respondents. Second, respondents might have spent parts of their life abroad, even if 
they were born in the country of the interview.  
 
Table 3 shows the enormous heterogeneity across individuals: very few of them have experienced 
negative inflation as their maximum (namely 16 respondents who were aged either 18 or 19 at the time 
of the survey), whereas at the other extreme, some have experienced hyperinflation, up to astronomical 
rates of 302,000,000% p.a., as measured in Greece in 1944. 5% of the respondents have lived through 
inflation rates above 80%. The enormous rates at the very tail of the distribution raise the mean inflation 
experience to a level of 18,475,070%, whereas the median is a much more modest 15.2%. Of course, 
this variable differs strongly across the various cohorts. Figure 2 plots histograms by year of birth. In 
order to visualize the distribution, the chart does not display any rate above the 95
th percentile, i.e. above 
80%, a treatment that affects the two oldest cohorts only, i.e. those born prior to 1926, or in between 
1926 and 1940. Despite the deletion of these outliers, the figure demonstrates that the more recently 
born cohorts clearly have had more uniform experiences, with a much reduced dispersion, and 
furthermore a substantially lower mean. 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
In our benchmark specifications, we will consider the maximum annual inflation rate that the 
respondent has experienced over the last 15 years (rather than over the entire adult lifetime, as 
underlying Figure 2 and Table 3), but we will vary this time span in a robustness test from 5 years to the 
entire adult life. For the benchmark specification, this amounts to first choosing the beginning of the 
relevant time span, which is given either by the year the respondent was turning 18, or by the year of the 
survey minus 15. The maximum inflation over the time window from this determined starting point 
until the survey year is then calculated, and assigned to the individual for that particular survey. Given 
the enormous heterogeneity in this variable, we transform it for our econometric analyses into a more 
tractable format, by calculating the deciles of the distribution over the entire sample, and by assigning 
each individual a value of 1 to 10, depending on her position in the distribution (e.g., a value of 1 is 
assigned for individuals whose inflation experience is below the first decile). 
 
In addition, we are interested in the hypothesis whether having lived through hyperinflation has a lasting 
effect on people’s attitudes. As there is no commonly agreed definition of hyperinflation, we have 
arbitrarily decided on a threshold of 200% annual inflation (but will discuss how changing this 
threshold affects our results). There are 770 individuals in the sample with such an experience, i.e. 1.5% 
of our sample, in Austria and Germany (around 1922-1923) and in Greece, Italy and Japan (around 
1944-1946).
7 For these individuals, our dummy variable “hyperinflation” takes the value of 1, for all 
others it is equal to zero. 
 
In analogy to our hypothesis that past experience matters for the choice of inflation in the survey, other 
experiences might also be important when it comes to choosing the political alternatives maintaining 
order in the nation, giving people more say in important government decisions, or protecting freedom of 
speech. By definition, however, the relevant factors that might explain the choice of these priorities are 
much more difficult to control for, and much harder to quantify. Furthermore, as for inflation, long 
historical time series are called for. One possibility is the data contained in the Cross-National Time 
Series Data Archive
8, an archive which contains data for over 200 countries, some going back to the 
                                                 
7 We have verified the occurrence of hyperinflation in these countries using other publicly available information, 
such as Wikipedia, or the websites and publications of the respective central banks. 
8 http://www.databanksinternational.com/  12
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nineteenth century, covering, among other, historical national data on the number of assassinations, 
general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots and revolutions as well as anti-
government demonstrations p.a.. Of these, only the latter turned out to be relevant for our analysis. Just 
as in the case of inflation experience, we have constructed a variable that contains the maximum number 
of anti-government demonstrations in a year that an individual has experienced over his lifetime or 
various different horizons, always only taking into account the experience as of the age of 18. Figure 3 
shows the distribution of respondents’ lifetime experience, suggesting that there is less heterogeneity 
than for inflation, but a similar variation across cohorts: more recently born cohorts have less dispersed 
experiences, and the distribution tends to have a lower mean. 
 
The life time experience for this variable is reasonably well behaved, such that we do not rearrange 
individuals according to their position on the distribution, but rather use the underlying variable itself in 
the regression. As with inflation, we will use the experience over 15 years in our benchmark 
regressions, but provide an assessment of the robustness to this assumption.  
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
To analyze the responses to the question of interest described above (say, ‘priority 1’), which 
encompasses four alternatives, we use a multinomial logit approach. The model is formulated in terms 
of the log of the odds ȍ of an outcome relative to a base category/outcome. For a dependent variable y 
with J alternatives, and explanatory variables xk, summarized in the vector x, the model can be written 
as  
 
(1)   b m b m xȕ
x
x
x | | ) | Pr(
) | Pr(
ln ) ( ln  
 
 
  :
b y
m y  for m = 1 to J-1, and m  b, 
 
where b is the base category. For convenience we chose the base category to be ‘fighting rising prices’ 
(in short ‘inflation’), thus we examine the odds of the three other alternatives relative to this one.  
 
The model can be interpreted in terms of factor (multiplicative) changes in the odds. Exponentiating the 
two sides of the model above, we have a multiplicative model in terms of the odds of outcome m 
relative to the base category b, 
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Holding other variables constant, a unit increase in the value of, say, xk will lead to a factor change in 
the odds of m relative to b by exp(ȕk m/b), or, an increase in the value of xk to xk+į , will lead to a factor 
change to these odds by exp(ȕk m/b  × į). The exp(ȕk m/b)  - which we will report in our tables containing 
the econometric results – can also be interpreted as odds ratios: 
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A value greater than one indicates that the odds of m vs. b increase as the explanatory variable 
increases, whereas a value below one implies that the odds decrease. Choosing ‘inflation’ as the 
benchmark category, we would therefore expect that a relatively high inflation experience (which 
should increase the importance placed on fighting inflation) leads to coefficients that are smaller than 
one. In the case of categorical variables, the coefficient for category n (say females) is the ratio of the 
odds of m vs. b for that category (females) relative to the same odds for the base category (males).  
 
As discussed above, our primary interest is the effect of the inflation experience of an individual on her 
propensity to choose ‘inflation’, but it is important to control for the effects of other possible 
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determinants. We will therefore explore alternative combinations of explanatory variables, starting from 
a simplest model (Model 1) containing only the inflation experience as well as country fixed effects, 
wave fixed effects, and country-wave fixed effects. The subsequent models control for the 
sociodemographic characteristics of the individuals (gender, age, education, income), and the other 
personal characteristics discussed above, namely political position, participation in political discussions, 
whether they are the chief wage earner or not and their exposure to antigovernment demonstrations 
(Model 2). In a further extension, we also include whether or not an individual has experienced 
hyperinflation (Model 3).  
 
Subsequently, we will drop the country-wave fixed effects (leaving country fixed effects and wave fixed 
effects) and try to explain the variation across countries and waves by the macroeconomic environment 
and the recent political unrest (as expressed with the index of antigovernment demonstrations; Model 4). 
As a final possible explanatory variable, we add the control for whether the country employs an 
inflation targeting strategy (Model 5). Finally, since the country-specific variables are also time specific 
and thus explain some of the time variation, we also drop the wave fixed effects (Models 6 and 7).
9  
 
The multinomial logit model rests on the assumption known as the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), which prescribes that the odds of two alternatives should not depend on other 
alternatives available, and in that sense they are ‘irrelevant’. The two most well known  formal tests for 
this assumption are the Hausman-McFadden (1984) test and the Small-Hsiao test (1985). The tests on 
our data show more often than not, applied on the various models that we have used, that the IIA 
assumption holds, the Small-Hsiao test always being favorable. However, since the usefulness of these 
tests in assessing violations of the IIA assumption has been doubted (Cheng and Long 2005) we also 
tested the robustness of our results by applying the multinomial probit model and results are indeed very 
similar. Moreover, since the question we analyze has been included continuously in the WVS and has 
thus been tested for over twenty years and analyzed extensively in the context of cultural values 
literature (for example, Inglehart 1997), we are confident that the alternatives seem sufficiently distinct 
to the respondents. 
 
To test the robustness of the effects of our explanatory variables with regard to the importance attributed 
to fighting inflation, we also model separately the responses to the same question when asked as a 
second priority, ‘priority 2’, and also the probability of choosing ‘inflation’ as first or second priority, 
irrespective of the other alternatives that get chosen by the individual.  
  
To model ‘priority 2’ we use again a multinomial logit model. Now, conditioning on each chosen 
alternative of ‘priority 1’, there are three remaining alternatives. Taking again ‘inflation’ as our base 
category, we model for each chosen alternative of ‘priority 1’ the two odds vs. ‘inflation’. The set of 
explanatory variables is that of Model 7. We only omit the hyperinflation variable because once the 
responses are conditioned on the response to ‘priority 1’, there are too few respondents having 
experienced hyperinflation in each subsample. 
 
The probability of choosing ‘inflation’, irrespective of the other alternatives, is modeled in two settings:  
We first model choosing ‘inflation’ either as first or second priority; secondly, we take the order of this 
choice into account. For the first setting, we use a logit model, where the dependent variable is 1 if 
‘inflation’ was chosen either as a first or second choice and 0 if it was not chosen at all. The logit model 
is derived in terms of an underlying variable where the probability of a positive response is observed 
when the underlying variable exceeds some threshold.  
 
Assuming an underlying ‘importance attributed to inflation’ 
 
(4)   H  c   i i x ȕ
* y , 
                                                 
9 We maintain the country fixed effects, as these are required to differentiate the slope of the income variable 
across countries. 14
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whether an individual chooses ‘inflation’ as a priority in the survey or not, is indicated by the 
observable variable y, where  
 
(5)   0   i y  if  0
* d i y and  1   i y  if  0
* ! i y  
 
The probability of a positive response conditional on the vector of explanatory variables x, is given by 
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Assuming that the İ is distributed logistically with Var(İ) = ʌ
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Thus, for a unit change in xk, the odds are expected to change by a factor of exp(ȕk), holding all other 
variables constant. Like for the multinomial logit models, we will report the exponentiated coefficients 
exp(ȕk). A value greater than 1 indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable, for instance in 
inflation experience, will increase the odds of choosing ‘inflation’.  
 
In the second setting, making now use of the order of choice, we fit an ordered logit model, where the 
dependent variable is 2 if ‘inflation’ was chosen as a first priority, 1 if ‘inflation’ was indicated as a 
second choice and 0 if it was not chosen at all. Assuming again an underlying variable determining the 
observed response - an underlying ‘importance attributed to inflation’ by an individual, the 
measurement model for binary outcomes is expanded to divide y* into K (3 in our case) ordinal 
categories, 
 
(8)   m yi    if  m i m y W W d d 
*
1  for m = 1 to K 
 
where the thresholds Ĳ1 through ĲK-1 are estimated. As usual, we assume Ĳ0 = -f and ĲK=  f. The 
probability of observing y = m for given values of the x’s corresponds to the region of the distribution 
where y* falls between Ĳm-1 and Ĳm: 
 
(9)   ) | Pr( ) | Pr(
*
1 x y x m m W W d d      m y . 
 
Substituting xȕ+İ for y*, we have 
 
(10)   ) ( ) ( ) | Pr( 1 xȕ F xȕ F x m m         W W m y , 
 
where F is the cumulative distribution function for İ. Assuming again the logistic distribution for F with 
Var(İ) =ʌ
2/3 we obtain the ordinal logit model. For the ordered logit model, we can define the odds that 
an outcome is less than or equal to m versus greater than m given x: 
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The effect of a unitary change in xk equals 
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Thus exp(-ȕk) can be interpreted as indicating the factor change in the odds of the outcome of y being 
less than or equal to m if xk increases by 1, holding all other variables constant. Factor changes in the 
odds of higher vs. lower values,  ) ( | x m m d ! : would equal exp(ȕk). The exp(ȕk) can be interpreted as the 
factor change in the odds of choosing  inflation with higher importance rather than lower if, say, xk 
increases by one unit, holding the other variables constant.   
 
Since our observations are clustered by country and wave the standard errors have been estimated taking 
the cluster structure into account. 
 
3. Inflation experience and inflation concerns 
What determines the inflation concerns expressed in the World Values Survey? This section presents 
the empirical results. We will first establish a benchmark regression that analyzes the determinants of 
respondents’ first priority, focusing initially on the variation within each country and each wave of the 
survey, and subsequently broadening the model to simultaneously identify the factors that move 
response patterns over time. Following this, we will test for the relevant horizon after which inflation 
memories fade, and test for robustness of our results by analyzing also the second choice in a number of 
ways.  
 
 
3.1  Determinants of respondents’ first priority 
Table 4 provides the results for the benchmark model, showing the odds ratios of picking maintaining 
order in the nation (“order”) as opposed to fighting rising prices (“inflation”) as first priority in the first 
panel, of answering giving people more say in important government decisions (“say”) rather than 
inflation in the second panel, and finally of prioritizing the protection of freedom of speech (“freedom of 
speech”) over the fight against inflation in the third panel. 
10 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
For each category, the model is built up consecutively, first only including respondents’ inflation 
experience, and subsequently adding more controls, as discussed in the preceding section. Model (1) 
provides a first indication that inflation memories matter: while there is no evidence that the odds of 
picking order over inflation are affected by inflation experience, the odds ratio is significantly below 
one for say and freedom of speech.
11 For all further extensions of the model, also the odds ratio of order 
relative to inflation turns out to be significantly different from one. The magnitude of this effect is 
sizable, and turns out to be rather robust for all three options, and across various model specifications, in 
the order of 0.9. This implies that the odds for all three political categories relative to inflation decrease 
by around 10% if an individual moves by one decile in the inflation experience distribution, or by 
around 30% in the case of a move by three deciles.
12 
 
All subsequent models control for demographics, with a number of these being relevant determinants 
for the choices of respondents. Their interpretation is in several cases not straightforward, as they refer 
to the odds ratios of option pairs. It could therefore be that a control variable has independent effects on 
the importance an individual attaches to both options, while our estimates would eventually only 
highlight which effect dominates. This notwithstanding, a number of results can be meaningfully 
                                                 
10 A variant of each of these models using the inflation experience of individuals in its categorical form is 
presented in the Appendix. 
11 Note that the stars in all tables indicate whether or not a variable is statistically significantly different from one. 
12 A move of three steps can be considered equivalent to a one-standard deviation change. The number is obtained 
as follows: An odds ratio of 0.9 is based on a parameter estimate of -0.105. A change in the independent variable 
of 3 implies an effect on the dependent variable of -0.32, which leads to an odds ratio of 0.729. 
,
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interpreted. For instance, females are substantially more likely to mention the fight against rising prices 
as their priority, with odds ratios in the order of 0.8 for all other choices over inflation. This is entirely 
consistent with the fact that females tend to have higher inflation expectations and inflation perceptions 
(Bryan and Venkatu 2001). Accordingly, they should also be more likely to be inflation averse. Being 
the chief wage earner of a household does affect choice outcomes, although less consistently so. It does 
not affect the odds of choosing say over inflation; however, and contrary to our priors, chief wage 
earners are somewhat less likely to see inflation as a concern relative to order and freedom of speech. 
 
With regard to age, we find strong effects that differ across the various options: older respondents are 
significantly more likely to opt for order as their first priority, while they are also more likely to 
prioritize the fight against inflation over say and freedom of speech. Although we are differentiating 6 
different age categories, the effect of age seems to be well described by a continuous process, given that 
our estimated odds ratios decline (for say and freedom of speech over inflation) or increase (for order 
over inflation) nearly monotonically with increasing age
13. Another important factor relates to the 
education of respondents: the higher their level of education, the larger their tendency to prioritize the 
political goals. Also here, effects are not only statistically significant, but also quantitatively large, with 
odds ratios of 2 and 3 for say over inflation and freedom of speech over inflation, respectively. 
 
Also income affects the answer probabilities in a significant way. While the model is estimated allowing 
for different slope coefficients in each country (by interacting the income variable with the country 
fixed effects), for presentational ease, Table 4 only reports the average effect across countries. Only 
little information is lost in that regard, given that the effect has the same direction in all countries, and is 
statistically significant in the vast majority of them. Accordingly, it holds that on average as well as in 
practically every country in our sample, higher income tends to reduce the importance attached to 
fighting rising prices relative to order and say (consistent with earlier results in the literature, e.g. 
Easterly and Fischer, 2001), whereas it lowers the tendency to prioritize freedom of speech over fighting 
rising prices.  
 
Moving on to the next set of variables, which relate to the role of politics, we find an intriguing effect of 
political opinions on survey responses. More conservative respondents tend to prioritize order, whereas 
they are less likely to prefer freedom of speech or say over the fight against inflation. The magnitude of 
this effect is sizable, with odds ratios of around 1.1 for order relative to inflation, and of around 0.9 to 
0.95 for the other combinations. Accordingly, the odds for order over inflation rise by around 10% if an 
individual moves political views by one notch, and by around 20% in the case of a one standard-
deviation move of 2 points.  
 
As expected, more politically-minded individuals are much more likely to prioritize the political choices 
over inflation: those who never discuss political issues, for instance, have 15% and 60% smaller odds 
ratios for order over inflation and freedom of speech or say over inflation, respectively, than those 
respondents with frequent political discussions. 
 
All except the first model include as possible determinant the respondents’ last 15 years’ experience of 
anti-government demonstrations, which does indeed affect the answer patterns in a statistically 
significant way, and with a non-negligible, yet not overly large magnitude: a one-standard deviation 
change (of around 4) changes the odds ratio by around 10 to 20%, in the expected direction: having 
experienced more political unrest increases the likelihood of choosing the political priorities over 
inflation. 
 
Another addition to the model, included in all specifications as of (3), relates to the experience of 
hyperinflation. Having lived through such drastic episodes (remember, hyperinflation is defined for 
annual inflation rates larger or equal to 200%) has lasting effects on respondents’ choices: opting for the 
                                                 
13 These findings are robust if we include cohorts instead of age in our model: earlier cohorts are more likely to 
prioritize order over inflation than the more recently born cohorts, whereas the latter are more likely to prioritize 
say or freedom of speech over inflation than the earlier ones. 17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1095
September 2009
fight against inflation is much more likely, with odds ratios of around 0.8 for order relative to inflation, 
of around 0.6 for say versus inflation, and of around 0.7 for freedom of speech versus inflation. It is 
important to note that these effects come on top of the concern about current inflation, and are exerting 
effects on respondents’ priorities despite the hyperinflation experience having been very long ago. 
Varying the definition of hyperinflation to more extreme levels leads to substantially larger effects, 
which are furthermore estimated to be extremely statistically significant (despite the fact that they are 
estimated on increasingly fewer observations). Setting the threshold for hyperinflation to 400% p.a. 
(which leaves 443 respondents with such an experience in the sample), we find odds ratios of around 0.7 
for order relative to inflation, and of around 0.5 for say versus inflation and for freedom of speech 
versus inflation. An even stricter definition of, say, 5000% p.a. (which leaves 40 respondents with such 
a dramatic experience in the sample) generates odd ratios of 0.4 for order relative to inflation, of 0.3 for 
say versus inflation, and  a stunningly low 0.05 for freedom of speech versus inflation. 
14 
 
As argued above, it is crucial to properly control for current events or developments that can affect the 
choice of respondents. Models (1) to (3) do so in the most stringent way, by including country fixed 
effects, wave fixed effects, as well as country-wave fixed effects. This eliminates all effects that vary 
across countries, over time for all countries, and over time for a given country. As a consequence, all 
other determinants explain only the remaining variation, i.e. they relate to within-country differences in 
response patterns for a given survey wave.  
 
While this is the most stringent way to ensure that our results are not driven by concurrent events, we 
would like to investigate to what extent current conditions can explain the variation across waves, as 
this allows testing whether the declining importance attached to price stability over time is related to the 
macroeconomic and political conditions prevailing at the time of the survey. For that purpose, we 
remove the country-wave fixed effects in models (4) and (5), leaving only wave fixed effects and 
country fixed effects, and subsequently removing also the wave fixed effects in models (6) and (7).
15 
 
Current economic conditions (as measured by the maximum annual inflation rate over the last 5 years 
and the lowest annual GDP growth rate
16 recorded over the last 5 years prior to the survey) move 
response patterns in the expected direction: higher recent inflation leads more respondents to be 
concerned about inflation developments, and lower recent GDP growth implies that inflation is regarded 
as less of an issue than giving people more say in government decisions.  
 
Current political conditions have less of an effect, although suggesting an interesting pattern: whereas 
having been confronted with many anti-government demonstrations earlier in life leads respondents to 
give high priority to giving people more say, and to protecting freedom of speech, more recent 
demonstrations lead respondents to favor maintaining order in the nation over inflation, but does not 
affect the relative likelihood of choosing freedom of speech or say.  
 
                                                 
14 The addition of a similar dummy variable that denotes whether or not a respondent has lived through 
deflationary periods (defined as negative annual inflation rates over two – or alternatively four – consecutive 
years) does not lead to statistically significant effects, while leaving all other results unaffected. The absence of 
any such effect might arise due to the one-sided formulation of the survey question, which does not relate to the 
stabilization of prices, but rather the fight against rising prices. 
15 For brevity, we do not report the individual country fixed effects. Given the widespread belief that there is a 
particularly strong inflation aversion in the German society, we tested whether the fixed effect for Germany is 
statistically different from the average of the fixed effects of all other countries in our sample. This is indeed the 
case; while the magnitude depends somewhat on the precise model, we find that the average of the countries’ fixed 
effects (relative to Germany as the base category) is larger than 1, for all the three odds we examine - order, say 
and freedom of speech over inflation. The difference is statistically significant, often at the 1% level, and 
coefficients range in between 1.3 and 2.2, suggesting that Germans are considerably more likely to prioritize 
inflation over the alternative options than citizens of the other countries.  
16 GDP growth rates are calculated based on PPP-adjusted GDP data as provided by the OECD, to allow for 
comparable figures across countries. 18
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A final test in this modeling framework, reported in columns (5) and (7), investigates the role that 
central bank policies might play in mitigating inflation concerns of the general public. Over the recent 
decade, inflation targeting has become an increasingly popular monetary policy framework. Inflation 
targeting comprises a publicly announced inflation target (which has generally helped central banks in 
anchoring inflation expectations), as well as a particular emphasis on communication (which might 
contribute to making the central bank better known and above all better understood by the general 
public). It is thus an interesting hypothesis whether inflation targeting mitigates concerns about price 
stability in the public.
17 There is no clear theoretical prior – agents in inflation targeting countries might 
be more aware about the importance to fight rising prices, being sensitized by corresponding central 
bank communication, or they might see inflation as less of a concern, if they trust that the central bank 
properly takes care of the problem. The expected sign is therefore ambiguous, and it remains an 
empirical issue which effect prevails. However, it should be stressed that in both cases, inflation 
targeting central banks seem to have managed to get through to the general public, by either raising their 
inflation awareness, or by building trust in the central bank’s determination to fight inflation. A 
significant effect in either direction would therefore suggest that inflation targeting does affect the 
attitudes of the general public. 
 
Looking at the results contained in Table 4, it is evident that the second effect prevails: the introduction 
of inflation targeting lowers inflation concerns in the general public, to a non-negligible extent: the odds 
ratio for picking order over inflation is estimated significantly at around 1.4 to 1.7. Note that this effect 
comes on top of a possible inflation-reduction achieved by inflation targeting central banks, given that 
the model controls for the recent inflation performance. A second point to note is that the model 
contains country-fixed effects, such that the coefficient on inflation targeting cannot be interpreted as a 
differential effect between targeters and non-targeters. Rather, it refers exclusively to the comparison 
across time within given countries, prior to and after the introduction of inflation targeting. 
 
A first robustness test for these results is contained in Appendix Table A2, where the sample of 
countries is split into the 15 countries belonging to the European Union, and all other countries. The 
pooling of countries might be problematic if they are too heterogeneous, as then the restriction of all 
parameters to be equal across countries was not plausible. Although we have restricted our sample to 
industrialized countries, such a concern could arise, for instance, because the sample includes Japan, 
which has experienced deflation, as well as Iceland, which has seen comparatively high levels of 
inflation relative to the rest of the sample. Homogeneity might therefore be more easily acceptable for 
the subset of European Union countries (especially given that we do not include the Eastern European 
countries in the sample). Table A2 provides the corresponding estimates, and shows that results are 
robust to the sample split. The only exception relates to the role of inflation targeting, which for the EU 
countries – as before – implies a mitigation of inflation concerns, whereas for the non-EU countries, the 
introduction of inflation targeting seems to have reduced the odds of picking order relative to inflation. 
As mentioned above, there is no clear prior as to the sign of the effect, whereas the existence of any 
effect signals that the communication of an inflation target is capable of affecting the views of the 
general public. 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that memories of high inflation can heighten inflation concerns of 
economic agents, in a statistically and economically significant fashion. In particular the experience of 
hyperinflation triggers a long-lasting inflation aversion among individuals (although this effect has been 
estimated on very few observations only). It is furthermore apparent that the reduced importance 
attached to fighting rising prices in more recent years is at least partially driven by a favorable 
concurrent inflation environment. A number of stylized facts that have been discovered in earlier work 
are replicated in this sample, namely the increased inflation concerns of females and the poor. Finally, 
                                                 
17 For a survey on the literature on central bank communication, including an assessment of the evidence on the 
effectiveness of inflation targeting, see Blinder et al. (2008). We have defined countries as inflation targeters as 
follows: Australia in the survey wave of 1996, Canada in 2000, Spain in 1996, Finland in 1996, United Kingdom 
in 1996 and 2000, New Zealand in 1996, Sweden in 1996 and 2000. 19
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central banks can shape the degree to which the general public is concerned about inflation by means of 
their monetary policy and communication strategies. 
 
 
3.2  The relevant horizon for agents’ memories 
In the preceding subsection, agents’ experiences had referred to a 15 year horizon. It remains to be seen 
whether this is the most relevant horizon, or whether inflation memories fade earlier, or last even longer. 
A first indication that memories might still be well and alive beyond 15 years is given by the fact that 
agents who lived through hyperinflation continue to be more concerned about inflationary pressures for 
as long as we observe them in our sample. Note that the hyperinflations took place around 1922-1923 
(Austria and Germany) and around 1944-1946 (Greece, Italy and Japan), respectively, and that for the 
various individuals, in between 55 and 68 years had passed by the time of the survey, such that it is 
probably fair to say that these extreme events stay in agents’ memories, and affect their attitudes, over 
their entire lifetime.  
 
With less drastic inflation experiences, people are more likely to forget, though, and this is the question 
we address in this subsection. We will test for the relevant horizon in an indirect way, namely by 
calculating inflation experiences over different horizons, starting from 5 years until the entire adult 
lifetime, and by studying which of these variants generates the best statistical fit in our models. Table 5 
shows the corresponding results, based on the full models as estimated in column (7) of Table 4. For 
convenience, we show only the relevant parameters, noting that all other parameters are remarkably 
robust.  
 
The various horizons turn out to affect the statistical fit only marginally. In terms of the magnitude of 
odds ratios, an inverse hump shape emerges for order relative to inflation and for say relative to 
inflation, with the largest effects estimated over the benchmark horizon of 15 years. In contrast, for 
freedom of speech relative to inflation, a linear pattern is apparent, with the largest effect at the very 
short end, i.e. at a 5-year horizon. The measures of statistical fit, such as the AIC and BIC criteria, 
reflect this, and accordingly are minimized for the 10 to 15 year horizon.  
 
TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE 
 
Results with regard to the maximum number of anti-government demonstrations show a very similar 
picture: as shown in Table 6, we find the largest effects at the 15 year horizon when it comes to say 
relative to inflation, whereas the effects are maximized for the 10 year horizon with regard to the other 
two choice sets. 
 
To summarize, the evidence on the relevant horizon suggests that inflation memories fade after 
approximately 10 to 15 years, if they refer to moderate inflation rates. Having experienced 
hyperinflation, however, is an extreme event that will last in people’s mind, and shape their preferences 
accordingly. 
 
 
3.3  Determinants of respondents’ second priority 
As mentioned above, the relevant question that has been the focus of the analysis so far is followed by 
another question, where respondents are allowed to pick a second choice, from the same set of options. 
In this subsection, we will conduct a series of tests that serve as robustness checks, by studying whether 
the relevant determinants for the first priority can similarly explain the second choice, and by 
subsequently modeling both choices simultaneously. 
 
In a first step, we re-estimate identical models to the one portrayed in column (7) of Table 4, but with 
the second priority as dependent variable, and conditioning on the first priority. We will estimate three 
different models, one for all respondents who have picked order as first choice, another one for all cases 
where the main priority was freedom of speech, and a third one with those observations where say was 
the first expressed priority. The only difference compared to our earlier model specification is that we 20
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no longer include a dummy variable for hyperinflation experience – after all, nearly all respondents with 
such an experience have picked inflation as first choice, thus leaving no meaningful variation in the 
remaining cases.  
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Results are remarkably robust, as shown in columns (1) to (6) in Table 7. As before, the odds ratios for 
inflation experience (now again at the 15 year horizon, as used in the estimates underlying Table 4) are 
estimated in the order of 0.9, and significantly so. Recent inflation affects, as above, in particular the 
odds of order relative to inflation and the odds of giving people more say in important government 
decision relative to inflation, albeit with much stronger reactions, suggesting that if inflation has been 
relatively high recently, respondents who have not picked inflation as first priority are considerably 
more likely to opt for it as second choice than if inflation has been contained over the last years.  
 
Moving on to a simultaneous modeling of the first and second choices, columns (7) and (8) of Table 7 
show the results of estimating a logit model (where inflation as first or second priority is modeled as 
one, and inflation having resulted as neither first nor second choice is equal to zero) and of an ordered 
logit model (for a variable that is equal to two if inflation is given first priority, equal to one if it is given 
second priority, and equal to zero otherwise).
18 Note that in this case, we would expect the coefficients 
for inflation experience to be greater than 1 (in contrast to the multinomial logit models, where the odds 
of picking inflation were in the denominator, such that a higher likelihood to pick inflation would show  
up in coefficients smaller than 1). This is indeed what we find, indicating that having experienced 
higher inflation increases the odds of choosing ‘inflation’, or the odds of choosing inflation with a 
higher priority rather than a lower one. Furthermore, all other relevant results obtained previously are 
confirmed also in this specification. 
 
 
4. Conclusions
Inflation outcomes are very likely to, at least partially, reflect the preferences of societies. Without 
public support, central banks will find it much more difficult to disinflate a high inflation economy, or 
to prevent inflation from rising in the first place. The different inflation experiences across countries in 
the 1980s, for instance, have often been explained by variations in the inflation aversion of the general 
public. In that debate, references have typically been made to the German case, where allegedly public 
support for the Bundesbank’s anti-inflationary stance was high due to the German experience of 
hyperinflation in 1923. 
 
This discussion suggests that memories of high inflation are a relevant factor in shaping a society’s 
preferences. If this is the case, industrialized countries might be about to experience a reduced inflation 
aversion among their citizens, given the fact that inflation has been moderate over the recent past. Over 
time, fewer and fewer members of the societies of industrialized countries will have a vivid memory of 
the great inflation of the 1970s/1980s (and of course even more so of the hyperinflation episodes, which 
date back much longer) – either because they have not experienced it, or because they forget over time.  
 
This paper has tested for the role of inflation memories in shaping the preferences of economic agents, 
and has confirmed that such memories do indeed play an important role. While memories of moderately 
high inflation tend to fade after around 10 to 15 years, the paper has also identified a lasting effect of 
hyperinflation experiences on individuals. The recent decline in the number of individuals who 
prioritize the fight against rising prices is therefore most likely not only due to the fact that inflation 
should indeed be less of a concern in an environment of low and stable inflation rates, but also due to 
the fading memories of high inflation.  
 
                                                 
18 All results are robust to using probit and ordered probit models, respectively. 21
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These findings have important implications for central banks. They suggest that public support for their 
mandate could possibly erode over time, due to the central banks’ own successes in taming inflation, 
thus lowering the sensitivity of the public towards rising prices. The longer central banks have 
successfully delivered price stability, the more important it is for them to engage in a pro-active 
communication, especially with the younger generations, about the merits of low and stable inflation. 
Fortunately, the findings in this paper suggest that central banks have tools at their disposal to shape 
public views about inflation, as the general public appears to be perceptive to central bank 
communication.  
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Figure 1: Inflation concerns and current inflation 
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Note: This charts shows, for each country and wave, the relationship between current annual inflation and the 
share of respondents giving either first or second priority to fighting rising prices. 25
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Table 1: Country and wave coverage 
 
1981-1984 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2000
European Union Austria 2,194 1990 1999
Belgium 2,906 1981 1990 1999
Denmark 2,468 1981 1990 1999
Finland 1,990 1990 1996 2000
France 2,476 1981 1990 1999
Germany 5,968 1981 1990 1997 1999
Greece 815 1999
Ireland 1,868 1981 1990 1999
Italy 3,135 1981 1990 1999
Luxembourg 441 1999
Netherlands 2,300 1981 1990 1999
Portugal 924 1990
Spain 5,472 1981 1990 1995 1999/2000
Sweden 1,697 1996 1999
UK 2,411 1981 1990 1999
Other Europeans Iceland 2,099 1984 1990 1999
Norway 2,720 1982 1990 1996
Switzerland 1,350 1989 1996
Other countries Australia 1,220 1995
Canada 1,480 2000
Japan 2,386 1981 1990 1995 2000
New Zealand 511 1998
USA 3,564 1990 1995 1999
Total 23 countries 52,395 12 countries 17 countries 10 countries 18 countries
Waves
Observations Country Area
 
Note: The table provides an overview of the country coverage, of the available number of observations per 
country, and of the waves conducted in each country.  
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable type Variable Obs. Mean Min Max
Lifetime experience
Maximum annual inflation  52395 184750.7 -0.02 3.02E+08
Max. of anti-govt. demonstrations p.a 52395 6.297 0 60
Hyperinflation experience 52395 0.015 0 1
Demographics
Female 52395 0.491 0 1
Chief wage earner 52395 0.575 0 1
         Age 18-24 52395 0.134 0 1
25-34 52395 0.208 0 1
35-44 52395 0.206 0 1
45-54 52395 0.170 0 1
55-64 52395 0.135 0 1
65+ 52395 0.147 0 1
         Education lower 52395 0.375 0 1
middle 52395 0.423 0 1
upper 52395 0.202 0 1
         Income low 52395 0.064 0 1
2 52395 0.097 0 1
3 52395 0.118 0 1
4 52395 0.129 0 1
5 52395 0.128 0 1
6 52395 0.116 0 1
7 52395 0.108 0 1
8 52395 0.087 0 1
high 52395 0.153 0 1
Role of politics
         Self-position on political scale left 52395 0.031 0 1
2 52395 0.036 0 1
3 52395 0.103 0 1
4 52395 0.115 0 1
5 52395 0.292 0 1
6 52395 0.158 0 1
7 52395 0.113 0 1
8 52395 0.090 0 1
9 52395 0.029 0 1
right 52395 0.035 0 1
         Political discussions w. friends Frequent 52395 0.177 0 1
Occasional 52395 0.573 0 1
Never 52395 0.251 0 1
 
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the various explanatory variables. 30
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Table 4: Determinants of survey responses, benchmark model 
Order vs Inflation
Past experience
1.003 0.966 * 0.966 * 0.936 *** 0.935 *** 0.867 *** 0.869 ***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017)
1.009 1.009 1.054 *** 1.053 ** 1.044 ** 1.045 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017)
0.803 ** 0.857 0.831 * 0.845 0.804 **
(0.085) (0.089) (0.085) (0.088) (0.083)
Current conditions
1.475 1.535 0.471 *** 0.541 ***
(1.340) (1.454) (0.096) (0.098)
0.880 4.170 0.248 3.921
(1.738) (9.830) (0.418) (5.730)
1.096 *** 1.108 *** 1.096 *** 1.109 ***
(0.033) (0.037) (0.023) (0.028)
1.440 ** 1.650 ***
(0.210) (0.223)
Demographics
0.810 *** 0.810 *** 0.811 *** 0.813 *** 0.815 *** 0.816 ***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
1.077 1.077 1.080 * 1.077 * 1.084 * 1.078
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050)
0.959 0.959 0.949 0.954 1.137 1.133
(0.089) (0.088) (0.085) (0.085) (0.092) (0.093)
0.986 0.985 0.968 0.975 1.212 ** 1.206 **
(0.098) (0.098) (0.103) (0.106) (0.093) (0.099)
1.171 1.170 1.158 1.163 1.449 *** 1.437 ***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.121) (0.121) (0.131) (0.129)
1.348 ** 1.367 *** 1.342 *** 1.353 *** 1.675 *** 1.673 ***
(0.160) (0.160) (0.143) (0.145) (0.155) (0.161)
1.697 *** 1.745 *** 1.686 *** 1.708 *** 2.102 *** 2.116 ***
(0.169) (0.172) (0.170) (0.170) (0.212) (0.216)
1.271 *** 1.271 *** 1.249 *** 1.252 *** 1.245 *** 1.252 ***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.063) (0.063)
1.433 *** 1.431 *** 1.450 *** 1.454 *** 1.468 *** 1.469 ***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.128) (0.129) (0.127) (0.127)
1.071 *** 1.073 *** 1.071 *** 1.071 *** 1.069 *** 1.070 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Role of politics
1.132 *** 1.132 *** 1.130 *** 1.131 *** 1.129 *** 1.130 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
1.021 1.021 1.013 1.015 1.015 1.017
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054)
0.848 ** 0.846 ** 0.843 ** 0.846 ** 0.840 ** 0.844 **
(0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065)
0.528 *** 1.830 *** 1.808 *** 0.436 ** 0.332 *** 1.240 ** 0.769
(0.075) (0.220) (0.220) (0.163) (0.129) (0.131) (0.133)
Upper education
Political self-positioning
Income
Constant
No political discussions
Occasional political discussions
Age 45-54
Age 55-64
Age 65+
Middle education
Chief wage earner
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Max demonstrations last 5 years
Inflation targeting country
Female
Number of demonstrations
Hyperinflation
Max inflation last 5 years
Min GDP growth last 5 years
(5) (6) (7)
Maximum inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note: The table shows results of the multinomial logit model of equation (1) (for the odds of “Maintaining order in 
the nation” versus “Fighting rising prices”) and presents the exponentiated regression coefficients exp(ȕk, m/b). 
The coefficient for income is the average coefficient across all countries. Numbers in brackets denote standard 
errors, which allow for clustering across countries. ***, **, and * indicate that the exponentiated coefficients are 
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Table 4 (continued): Determinants of survey responses, benchmark model 
Say vs Inflation
Past experience
0.906 *** 0.952 ** 0.952 ** 0.939 ** 0.939 ** 0.897 *** 0.897 ***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015)
0.998 0.998 1.019 * 1.020 ** 1.027 * 1.028 *
(0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
0.678 *** 0.579 *** 0.587 *** 0.568 *** 0.562 ***
(0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.090) (0.090)
Current conditions
0.487 0.453 0.364 ** 0.372 **
(0.289) (0.288) (0.181) (0.188)
0.002 * 0.001 ** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
0.993 0.987 1.013 1.015
(0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027)
0.799 1.092
(0.129) (0.152)
Demographics
0.857 *** 0.857 *** 0.856 *** 0.855 *** 0.855 *** 0.855 ***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
1.048 1.047 1.041 1.042 1.045 1.043
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
1.008 1.009 0.998 0.997 1.098 1.097
(0.086) (0.085) (0.078) (0.080) (0.089) (0.088)
0.904 0.904 0.892 0.890 1.003 1.003
(0.080) (0.079) (0.074) (0.077) (0.081) (0.081)
0.930 0.930 0.911 0.910 1.018 1.016
(0.093) (0.092) (0.089) (0.091) (0.098) (0.097)
0.797 * 0.811 * 0.803 * 0.801 * 0.893 0.893
(0.099) (0.097) (0.093) (0.096) (0.098) (0.098)
0.720 *** 0.750 *** 0.750 *** 0.746 *** 0.826 * 0.828
(0.084) (0.082) (0.080) (0.084) (0.096) (0.096)
1.628 *** 1.628 *** 1.664 *** 1.660 *** 1.692 *** 1.695 ***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.104) (0.105) (0.108) (0.108)
2.227 *** 2.223 *** 2.273 *** 2.271 *** 2.317 *** 2.320 ***
(0.199) (0.200) (0.204) (0.204) (0.213) (0.214)
1.011 1.014 ** 1.013 * 1.013 * 1.010 1.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Role of politics
0.913 *** 0.913 *** 0.915 *** 0.914 *** 0.914 *** 0.914 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
0.635 *** 0.634 *** 0.635 *** 0.634 *** 0.639 *** 0.640 ***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
0.415 *** 0.414 *** 0.413 *** 0.411 *** 0.413 *** 0.414 ***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
1.981 *** 28.017 *** 27.568 *** 8.730 *** 10.546 *** 12.703 *** 11.665 ***
(0.387) (4.153) (4.079) (3.164) (3.376) (2.162) (3.190)
Constant
Income
Political self-positioning
Occasional political discussions
No political discussions
Age 55-64
Age 65+
Middle education
Upper education
Chief wage earner
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Age 45-54
Min GDP growth last 5 years
Max demonstrations last 5 years
Inflation targeting country
Female
Maximum inflation
Number of demonstrations
Hyperinflation
Max inflation last 5 years
(5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note: The table shows results of the multinomial logit model of equation (1) (for the odds of “Giving people more 
say” versus “Fighting rising prices”) and presents the exponentiated regression coefficients exp(ȕk  m/b). The 
coefficient for income is the average coefficient across all countries. Numbers in brackets denote standard errors, 
which allow for clustering across countries. ***, **, and * indicate that the exponentiated coefficients are 
statistically significantly different from one at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  32
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1095
September 2009
Table 4 (continued): Determinants of survey responses, benchmark model 
Freedom of speech vs 
Inflation
Past experience
0.877 *** 0.953 ** 0.952 ** 0.938 * 0.937 * 0.910 *** 0.909 ***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) (0.036) (0.022) (0.021)
0.988 0.988 1.009 1.010 1.042 * 1.043 *
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023)
0.713 0.689 0.693 0.656 * 0.648 *
(0.167) (0.161) (0.163) (0.161) (0.160)
Current conditions
0.419 0.384 0.323 0.327
(0.392) (0.340) (0.316) (0.323)
0.378 0.173 0.027 * 0.035
(1.376) (0.678) (0.052) (0.083)
0.990 0.984 0.971 0.972
(0.044) (0.048) (0.040) (0.043)
0.854 1.059
(0.190) (0.191)
Demographics
0.794 *** 0.794 *** 0.797 *** 0.797 *** 0.792 *** 0.793 ***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
1.129 *** 1.129 *** 1.127 *** 1.128 *** 1.113 ** 1.111 **
(0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047)
0.844 * 0.844 * 0.830 * 0.832 * 0.853 0.854
(0.082) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.092) (0.092)
0.728 *** 0.727 *** 0.714 *** 0.715 *** 0.741 ** 0.742 **
(0.081) (0.081) (0.084) (0.084) (0.090) (0.091)
0.778 ** 0.778 ** 0.763 ** 0.765 ** 0.788 0.787
(0.098) (0.098) (0.101) (0.101) (0.124) (0.124)
0.714 *** 0.725 ** 0.708 *** 0.710 *** 0.724 ** 0.725 **
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.111) (0.111)
0.699 *** 0.724 ** 0.699 *** 0.700 ** 0.711 ** 0.715 **
(0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.120) (0.120)
1.890 *** 1.889 *** 1.831 *** 1.828 *** 1.904 *** 1.906 ***
(0.127) (0.127) (0.119) (0.119) (0.134) (0.134)
3.253 *** 3.248 *** 3.291 *** 3.290 *** 3.431 *** 3.434 ***
(0.318) (0.318) (0.332) (0.333) (0.359) (0.360)
0.976 *** 0.978 *** 0.976 *** 0.976 *** 0.972 *** 0.972 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Role of politics
0.951 *** 0.951 *** 0.952 *** 0.952 *** 0.953 *** 0.953 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
0.639 *** 0.639 *** 0.635 *** 0.634 *** 0.638 *** 0.638 ***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
0.407 *** 0.406 *** 0.404 *** 0.404 *** 0.405 *** 0.406 ***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046)
2.424 *** 4.890 *** 4.819 *** 4.350 *** 4.999 *** 8.073 *** 7.648 ***
(0.583) (0.866) (0.861) (1.769) (1.612) (1.671) (2.040)
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Wave fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES NO NO
Country-wave fixed effects YES YES YES NO NO NO NO
Number of observations 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395
McFadden's Adj R2 0.058 0.092 0.092 0.088 0.088 0.084 0.084
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 0.159 0.202 0.202 0.230 0.231 0.221 0.222
AIC 129775 92724 92716 125628 125584 126169 126127
BIC 129802 92937 92929 125841 125796 126382 126340
No political discussions
Constant
Upper education
Income
Political self-positioning
Occasional political discussions
Age 45-54
Age 55-64
Age 65+
Middle education
Female
Chief wage earner
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Max inflation last 5 years
Min GDP growth last 5 years
Max demonstrations last 5 years
Inflation targeting country
Maximum inflation
Number of demonstrations
Hyperinflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 
Note: The table shows results of the multinomial logit model of equation (1) (for the odds of “Protecting freedom 
of speech” versus “Fighting rising prices”) and presents the exponentiated regression coefficients exp(ȕk m/b). The 
coefficient for income is the average coefficient across all countries. Numbers in brackets denote standard errors, 
which allow for clustering across countries. ***, **, and * indicate that the exponentiated coefficients are 
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Table 5: Horizon of inflation memories 
Order vs Inflation
0.884 *** 0.879 *** 0.869 *** 0.882 *** 0.911 *** 0.936 ** 0.941 ***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.031) (0.025) (0.022)
Say vs Inflation
0.907 *** 0.904 *** 0.897 *** 0.928 *** 0.937 ** 0.951 ** 0.942 ***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.021) (0.018)
Freedom of speech vs Inflation
0.886 *** 0.907 *** 0.909 *** 0.939 *** 0.954 * 0.961 * 0.949 **
(0.034) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.020)
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
W a v e  f i x e d  e f f e c t s N ON ON ON ON ON ON O
Country-wave fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Number of observations 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395
McFadden's Adj R2 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.083 0.083 0.083
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 0.221 0.222 0.222 0.220 0.219 0.218 0.218
AIC 126185 126128 126127 126237 126327 126376 126375
BIC 126398 126340 126340 126449 126540 126589 126588
25 years 30 years Adult life 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years
Maximum inflation exp. 
Maximum inflation exp. 
Maximum inflation exp. 
 
Note: The table shows results of the multinomial logit model of equation (1) and presents the exponentiated 
regression coefficients exp(ȕk m/b). The specification of the model follows the one of column (7) in Table 4. The 
models in the different columns vary the horizon over which the inflation experience has been calculated from 5 
years prior to the survey to the entire adult life of a respondent. The 15 year horizon corresponds to the one chosen 
in the benchmark models of Table 4. Numbers in brackets denote standard errors, which allow for clustering 
across countries. ***, **, and * indicate that the exponentiated coefficients are statistically significantly different 
from one at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Table 6: Horizon of memories of political unrest 
Order vs Inflation
1.012 1.072 *** 1.045 *** 1.024 * 1.006 1.002 1.002
(0.035) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
Say vs Inflation
0.949 1.017 1.028 * 1.008 1.007 * 1.006 *** 1.006 ***
(0.044) (0.036) (0.015) (0.016) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Freedom of speech vs Inflation
0.926 *** 1.058 1.043 * 1.003 1.002 1.003 1.005 ***
(0.025) (0.042) (0.023) (0.018) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
W a v e  f i x e d  e f f e c t s N ON ON ON ON ON ON O
Country-wave fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Number of observations 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395
McFadden's Adj R2 0.084 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.221 0.221 0.222
AIC 126126.6 126105.6 126127.4 126143.9 126153.8 126152.4 126148.3
BIC 126339.4 126318.4 126340.2 126356.7 126366.6 126365.2 126361.1
25 years 30 years Adult life 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years
Number of demonstrations
Number of demonstrations
Number of demonstrations
 
Note: The table shows results of the multinomial logit model of equation (1) and presents the exponentiated 
regression coefficients exp(ȕk m/b). The specification of the model follows the one of column (7) in Table 4. The 
models in the different columns vary the horizon over which the experience of political unrest has been calculated 
from 5 years prior to the survey to the entire adult life of a respondent. The 15 year horizon corresponds to the one 
chosen in the benchmark models of Table 4. Numbers in brackets denote standard errors, which allow for 
clustering across countries. ***, **, and * indicate that the exponentiated coefficients are statistically significantly 
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Table 7: Modeling ‘inflation’ as 2
nd choice, and the incidence of picking ‘inflation’  
Past experience
0.895 *** 0.905 *** 0.876 *** 0.947 ** 0.902 *** 0.945 * 1.115 *** 1.118 ***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014)
0.983 1.010 1.013 1.005 0.990 0.989 0.99 0.979
(0.018) (0.028) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
Current conditions
0.257 ** 0.617 0.218 *** 0.866 0.060 *** 0.144 ** 2.849 * 2.539 *
(0.137) (0.430) (0.032) (0.601) (0.033) (0.114) (1.736) (1.293)
2.365 56.525 0.032 0.012 0.162 0.014 4.102 4.630
(6.428) (182.320) (0.078) (0.039) (0.508) (0.047) (7.437) (7.163)
1.054 ** 0.969 1.098 *** 1.009 1.041 * 1.026 0.981 0.970
(0.022) (0.035) (0.039) (0.029) (0.025) (0.032) (0.026) (0.022)
1.663 ** 2.462 *** 1.068 1.394 1.750 * 1.562 ** 0.647 *** 0.666 ***
(0.335) (0.735) (0.168) (0.322) (0.531) (0.313) (0.086) (0.076)
Demographics
0.880 *** 0.813 *** 0.797 *** 0.785 *** 0.923 1.082 1.209 *** 1.200 ***
(0.043) (0.053) (0.054) (0.031) (0.053) (0.080) (0.042) (0.038)
0.980 1.000 0.985 1.048 1.144 * 1.203 ** 0.953 ** 0.946 **
(0.043) (0.056) (0.079) (0.071) (0.087) (0.110) (0.022) (0.022)
1.266 ** 1.038 1.159 0.866 1.188 0.894 0.952 0.961
(0.120) (0.127) (0.120) (0.087) (0.143) (0.125) (0.070) (0.069)
1.149 1.010 1.278 *** 0.830 1.248 0.974 0.989 0.991
(0.118) (0.157) (0.107) (0.111) (0.220) (0.173) (0.083) (0.081)
1.122 1.019 1.390 ** 0.905 1.314 1.011 0.939 0.932
(0.100) (0.134) (0.181) (0.149) (0.227) (0.159) (0.096) (0.092)
0.985 1.099 1.823 *** 1.026 1.674 *** 0.962 0.920 0.919
(0.115) (0.178) (0.304) (0.160) (0.268) (0.150) (0.095) (0.089)
1.008 1.152 1.386 ** 0.783 1.430 *** 0.557 *** 0.977 0.921
(0.110) (0.183) (0.194) (0.151) (0.197) (0.092) (0.112) (0.097)
1.278 *** 1.479 *** 1.177 ** 1.462 *** 0.919 1.152 * 0.676 *** 0.668 ***
(0.056) (0.083) (0.079) (0.099) (0.062) (0.088) (0.028) (0.029)
1.461 *** 1.749 *** 1.238 ** 2.260 *** 1.138 1.684 *** 0.491 *** 0.483 ***
(0.081) (0.177) (0.124) (0.180) (0.109) (0.164) (0.033) (0.033)
1.000 1.068 *** 1.115 *** 1.042 *** 1.235 *** 1.132 *** 0.950 *** 0.946 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Role of politics
0.988 1.012 1.110 *** 0.951 *** 1.164 *** 0.922 *** 1.002 0.997
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.022) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
0.841 *** 0.768 *** 0.923 0.731 *** 0.812 * 0.619 *** 1.384 *** 1.359 ***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.039) (0.089) (0.055) (0.047) (0.049)
0.622 *** 0.573 *** 0.833 ** 0.503 *** 0.828 * 0.455 *** 1.962 *** 1.896 ***
(0.058) (0.050) (0.067) (0.045) (0.090) (0.054) (0.116) (0.122)
3.510 *** 1.484 0.881 3.633 *** 0.393 *** 3.875 *** 0.313 ***
(0.931) (0.541) (0.177) (0.928) (0.119) (1.142) (0.055)
2.822 ***
(0.444)
11.539 ***
(1.805)
Country fixed effects YES YES
Wave fixed effects NO NO
Country-wave fixed effects NO NO
Number of observations 52395 52395
McFadden's Adj R2 0.096 0.072
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 0.167 0.151
AIC 61860 89561
BIC 62020 89729
Ordered 
logit model
0.064
0.169
18201
Logit model
18373
YES
NO
NO
9584 14634
NO
NO
YES
29536
29354
0.157
0.061 0.060
0.152
39683
39872
YES
NO
NO
19359
1st choice "Order" 1st choice "Say" 1st choice "Free speech"
Order vs 
Inflation
Say vs 
Inflation
Say vs 
Inflation
Free speech 
vs Infl. 
Order vs 
Inflation
Free speech 
vs Infl. 
τ 2
Age 65+
Middle education
Upper education
Income
Political self-positioning
Occasional political discussions
Age 45-54
Age 55-64
τ 1
Female
Chief wage earner
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
No political discussions
Constant
Max demonstrations last 5 years
Inflation targeting country
Maximum inflation
Number of demonstrations
Max inflation last 5 years
Min GDP growth last 5 years
Note: Results in the first 6 columns are based on multinomial logit models (eq. 1), modeling the 2
nd choice of 
respondents, conditional on the 1
st choice. Results in column 7 are based on a logit model (eq. 7), and explain 
whether or not a respondent has picked inflation as 1
st or 2
nd priority. Column 8 presents results of an ordered logit 
model (eq. 11), explaining whether a respondent has picked inflation as 1
st priority, as 2
nd priority, or not at all. All 
coefficients are odds ratios. Numbers in brackets denote standard errors, which allow for clustering across 
countries. ***, **, and * indicate that the exponentiated coefficients are statistically significantly different from 
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Appendix:  Table A1: Determinants of survey responses, inflation experience in 
categorical form 
Order vs Inflation
Past experience
1.057 0.845 ** 0.844 ** 0.614 *** 0.634 *** 0.687 *** 0.699 ***
(0.057) (0.060) (0.060) (0.083) (0.089) (0.082) (0.072)
0.954 0.788 ** 0.786 ** 0.643 *** 0.638 *** 0.594 *** 0.573 ***
(0.083) (0.090) (0.090) (0.096) (0.096) (0.075) (0.071)
1.083 0.916 0.911 1.023 1.010 0.751 ** 0.743 **
(0.102) (0.089) (0.089) (0.126) (0.122) (0.102) (0.103)
1.139 0.868 0.861 0.673 *** 0.661 *** 0.457 *** 0.452 ***
(0.146) (0.115) (0.114) (0.088) (0.087) (0.068) (0.060)
1.068 0.806 0.800 0.683 *** 0.678 *** 0.513 *** 0.505 ***
(0.146) (0.131) (0.133) (0.092) (0.085) (0.038) (0.038)
1.127 0.802 * 0.794 * 0.631 *** 0.618 *** 0.385 *** 0.376 ***
(0.117) (0.098) (0.097) (0.103) (0.101) (0.071) (0.065)
1.266 * 0.866 0.856 0.542 *** 0.529 *** 0.306 *** 0.297 ***
(0.163) (0.146) (0.145) (0.099) (0.100) (0.072) (0.062)
0.990 0.687 ** 0.690 ** 0.549 *** 0.547 *** 0.290 *** 0.306 ***
(0.156) (0.122) (0.125) (0.088) (0.084) (0.040) (0.025)
1.109 0.735 0.722 * 0.409 *** 0.412 *** 0.220 *** 0.232 ***
(0.173) (0.138) (0.134) (0.077) (0.080) (0.050) (0.048)
1.010 1.011 1.071 *** 1.068 *** 1.048 *** 1.047 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
0.808 ** 0.843 * 0.823 ** 0.847 * 0.795 **
(0.087) (0.081) (0.081) (0.084) (0.081)
Current conditions
2.751 2.623 0.524 *** 0.601 ***
(2.619) (2.627) (0.085) (0.091)
0.946 3.091 0.293 6.523
(1.905) (7.465) (0.582) (11.456)
1.090 *** 1.097 *** 1.094 *** 1.105 ***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.022) (0.028)
1.247 1.722 ***
(0.188) (0.193)
Demographics
0.810 *** 0.810 *** 0.812 *** 0.812 *** 0.816 *** 0.817 ***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
1.078 * 1.077 1.080 * 1.078 * 1.090 * 1.082 *
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (0.051)
0.964 0.964 0.948 0.953 1.162 ** 1.155 *
(0.091) (0.090) (0.085) (0.084) (0.087) (0.086)
1.000 0.999 0.987 0.994 1.258 *** 1.248 ***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.097) (0.097) (0.100) (0.103)
1.188 1.187 1.176 * 1.183 * 1.503 *** 1.486 ***
(0.130) (0.130) (0.115) (0.113) (0.130) (0.124)
1.367 ** 1.385 *** 1.365 *** 1.376 *** 1.737 *** 1.730 ***
(0.168) (0.168) (0.146) (0.146) (0.140) (0.148)
1.720 *** 1.767 *** 1.727 *** 1.746 *** 2.190 *** 2.203 ***
(0.174) (0.176) (0.162) (0.160) (0.199) (0.204)
1.270 *** 1.270 *** 1.252 *** 1.253 *** 1.251 *** 1.259 ***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.075) (0.066) (0.066)
1.430 *** 1.428 *** 1.450 *** 1.451 *** 1.479 *** 1.480 ***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.130) (0.130) (0.129) (0.129)
1.072 *** 1.073 *** 1.073 *** 1.073 *** 1.070 *** 1.071 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Role of politics
Political self-positioning -right 1.132 *** 1.132 *** 1.130 *** 1.130 *** 1.129 *** 1.129 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
1.021 1.020 1.017 1.018 1.018 1.021
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054)
0.846 ** 0.844 ** 0.844 ** 0.845 ** 0.844 ** 0.848 **
(0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
1.472 *** 1.912 *** 1.879 *** 0.326 *** 0.288 *** 1.120 0.700
(0.204) (0.249) (0.244) (0.137) (0.118) (0.222) (0.154)
(5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Income
Occasional political discussions
No political discussions
Constant
Age 55-64
Age 65+
Middle education
Upper education
Chief wage earner
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Age 45-54
Min GDP growth last 5 years
Max demonstrations last 5 years
Inflation targeting country
Female
Maximum inflation -                        
10th decile
Number of demonstrations
Hyperinflation
Max inflation last 5 years
Maximum inflation -                        
6th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
7th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
8th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
9th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
2nd decile
Maximum inflation -                        
3rd decile
Maximum inflation -                        
4th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
5th decile
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Table A1 (continued): Determinants of survey responses, inflation experience in 
categorical form 
Say vs Inflation
Past experience
0.845 0.901 0.900 0.750 * 0.706 * 0.843 0.841
(0.111) (0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.129) (0.112) (0.112)
0.808 * 0.948 0.944 0.771 * 0.780 * 0.689 *** 0.680 ***
(0.099) (0.132) (0.132) (0.116) (0.116) (0.090) (0.088)
0.948 0.986 0.978 0.944 0.966 0.767 *** 0.759 ***
(0.123) (0.116) (0.113) (0.091) (0.090) (0.066) (0.065)
0.711 *** 0.888 0.879 0.684 *** 0.704 *** 0.565 *** 0.559 ***
(0.067) (0.114) (0.113) (0.070) (0.076) (0.053) (0.053)
0.752 ** 0.894 0.887 0.796 * 0.806 * 0.710 *** 0.708 ***
(0.108) (0.135) (0.137) (0.100) (0.094) (0.079) (0.080)
0.701 *** 0.870 0.859 0.659 ** 0.683 ** 0.491 *** 0.484 ***
(0.095) (0.130) (0.127) (0.124) (0.130) (0.103) (0.100)
0.649 *** 0.843 0.830 0.776 0.806 0.537 *** 0.524 ***
(0.091) (0.130) (0.128) (0.126) (0.133) (0.085) (0.082)
0.386 *** 0.589 *** 0.592 *** 0.468 *** 0.474 *** 0.305 *** 0.304 ***
(0.062) (0.098) (0.097) (0.075) (0.080) (0.034) (0.035)
0.424 *** 0.731 0.714 0.581 ** 0.579 ** 0.361 *** 0.361 ***
(0.114) (0.178) (0.172) (0.142) (0.142) (0.095) (0.093)
0.993 0.994 1.022 * 1.026 ** 1.028 1.028
(0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020)
0.693 *** 0.624 *** 0.642 *** 0.621 *** 0.617 ***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.086) (0.090)
Current conditions
0.620 0.661 0.389 ** 0.394 **
(0.236) (0.267) (0.177) (0.180)
0.004 * 0.001 ** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
(0.012) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009)
1.001 0.990 1.024 1.023
(0.019) (0.018) (0.028) (0.029)
0.681 ** 1.035
(0.105) (0.146)
Demographics
0.857 *** 0.857 *** 0.856 *** 0.856 *** 0.856 *** 0.856 ***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
1.050 1.050 1.043 1.046 1.046 1.044
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
1.002 1.002 1.001 0.990 1.120 1.120
(0.089) (0.088) (0.077) (0.078) (0.094) (0.092)
0.904 0.902 0.905 0.894 1.031 1.031
(0.083) (0.082) (0.072) (0.073) (0.087) (0.086)
0.928 0.927 0.923 0.914 1.048 1.047
(0.093) (0.093) (0.082) (0.084) (0.097) (0.096)
0.794 * 0.807 * 0.810 * 0.800 * 0.913 0.914
(0.101) (0.100) (0.089) (0.093) (0.100) (0.099)
0.715 *** 0.744 *** 0.757 *** 0.742 *** 0.843 * 0.844
(0.082) (0.080) (0.070) (0.075) (0.087) (0.088)
1.626 *** 1.626 *** 1.657 *** 1.651 *** 1.680 *** 1.681 ***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.100) (0.102) (0.103) (0.104)
2.215 *** 2.211 *** 2.276 *** 2.269 *** 2.325 *** 2.328 ***
(0.200) (0.200) (0.200) (0.201) (0.211) (0.211)
1.012 * 1.014 ** 1.013 * 1.013 * 1.009 1.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Role of politics
Political self-positioning  -right 0.913 *** 0.913 *** 0.914 *** 0.914 *** 0.914 *** 0.914 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
0.634 *** 0.634 *** 0.636 *** 0.634 *** 0.639 *** 0.639 ***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
0.415 *** 0.414 *** 0.416 *** 0.413 *** 0.417 *** 0.417 ***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
1.997 *** 30.385 *** 29.673 *** 7.819 *** 9.658 *** 12.010 *** 11.770 ***
(0.365) (5.009) (4.782) (2.968) (3.288) (3.228) (4.064)
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
Income
Occasional political discussions
No political discussions
Constant
Age 55-64
Age 65+
Middle education
Upper education
Chief wage earner
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Age 45-54
Min GDP growth last 5 years
Max demonstrations last 5 years
Inflation targeting country
Female
Maximum inflation -                        
10th decile
Number of demonstrations
Hyperinflation
Max inflation last 5 years
Maximum inflation -                        
6th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
7th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
8th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
9th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
2nd decile
Maximum inflation -                        
3rd decile
Maximum inflation -                        
4th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
5th decile
Note: See notes to table 4. Inflation experience enters this model in its categorical form.  37
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Table A1 (cont.): Determinants of survey responses, inflation experience in 
categorical form 
Freedom of speech vs Inflation
Past experience
0.599 *** 0.661 *** 0.660 *** 0.535 *** 0.514 *** 0.560 *** 0.556 ***
(0.060) (0.074) (0.073) (0.130) (0.126) (0.105) (0.102)
0.676 *** 0.832 * 0.828 * 0.730 * 0.737 * 0.668 ** 0.653 ***
(0.077) (0.080) (0.080) (0.124) (0.126) (0.112) (0.106)
0.685 ** 0.775 ** 0.769 ** 0.967 0.985 0.819 ** 0.809 **
(0.111) (0.092) (0.089) (0.116) (0.113) (0.077) (0.076)
0.562 *** 0.752 *** 0.745 *** 0.657 *** 0.668 ** 0.604 *** 0.593 ***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.102) (0.106) (0.072) (0.067)
0.536 *** 0.718 * 0.712 * 0.775 * 0.777 * 0.792 ** 0.779 **
(0.112) (0.128) (0.128) (0.109) (0.109) (0.087) (0.082)
0.536 *** 0.760 * 0.751 ** 0.523 *** 0.536 *** 0.426 *** 0.418 ***
(0.090) (0.111) (0.108) (0.118) (0.122) (0.114) (0.109)
0.462 *** 0.716 ** 0.706 *** 0.585 ** 0.597 ** 0.395 *** 0.383 ***
(0.087) (0.094) (0.093) (0.151) (0.153) (0.104) (0.100)
0.291 *** 0.535 *** 0.537 *** 0.584 ** 0.581 ** 0.430 *** 0.425 ***
(0.073) (0.118) (0.120) (0.148) (0.150) (0.071) (0.066)
0.304 *** 0.705 ** 0.690 ** 0.546 * 0.539 ** 0.384 *** 0.383 ***
(0.109) (0.125) (0.122) (0.175) (0.168) (0.108) (0.106)
0.983 0.984 1.022 1.025 * 1.047 * 1.047 *
(0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026)
0.721 0.678 * 0.696 0.663 * 0.656 *
(0.173) (0.157) (0.161) (0.157) (0.158)
Current conditions
0.691 0.682 0.411 0.417
(0.507) (0.480) (0.322) (0.330)
1.409 0.299 0.066 0.087
(4.660) (0.975) (0.111) (0.183)
0.964 0.953 0.958 0.958
(0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.042)
0.707 ** 1.050
(0.114) (0.162)
Demographics
0.795 *** 0.796 *** 0.795 *** 0.795 *** 0.792 *** 0.792 ***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047)
1.132 *** 1.131 *** 1.125 *** 1.128 *** 1.114 ** 1.112 **
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
0.876 0.877 0.835 * 0.829 * 0.886 0.887
(0.084) (0.084) (0.079) (0.080) (0.086) (0.084)
0.765 ** 0.764 ** 0.730 *** 0.725 *** 0.781 ** 0.782 **
(0.087) (0.087) (0.081) (0.080) (0.089) (0.087)
0.818 0.818 0.778 ** 0.774 ** 0.829 0.828
(0.105) (0.105) (0.096) (0.096) (0.116) (0.114)
0.750 ** 0.761 ** 0.723 ** 0.718 ** 0.760 ** 0.762 **
(0.104) (0.103) (0.092) (0.093) (0.106) (0.105)
0.734 ** 0.758 ** 0.721 ** 0.713 ** 0.751 * 0.756 *
(0.102) (0.104) (0.099) (0.100) (0.114) (0.114)
1.891 *** 1.891 *** 1.847 *** 1.841 *** 1.909 *** 1.911 ***
(0.127) (0.127) (0.122) (0.123) (0.133) (0.133)
3.261 *** 3.257 *** 3.309 *** 3.302 *** 3.459 *** 3.464 ***
(0.320) (0.320) (0.329) (0.330) (0.351) (0.351)
0.977 *** 0.979 *** 0.976 *** 0.976 *** 0.970 *** 0.970 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Role of politics
Political self-positioning -right 0.951 *** 0.951 *** 0.951 *** 0.951 *** 0.952 *** 0.952 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
0.639 *** 0.638 *** 0.636 *** 0.634 *** 0.639 *** 0.639 ***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
0.404 *** 0.404 *** 0.404 *** 0.402 *** 0.406 *** 0.406 ***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
2.473 *** 5.500 *** 5.381 *** 4.331 *** 5.324 *** 8.798 *** 8.567 ***
(0.582) (1.291) (1.248) (1.637) (1.687) (2.617) (2.944)
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Wave fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES NO NO
Country-wave fixed effects YES YES YES NO NO NO NO
Number of observations 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395 52395
McFadden's Adj R2 0.058 0.091 0.091 0.089 0.089 0.085 0.086
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 0.160 0.203 0.203 0.233 0.233 0.225 0.226
AIC 129760.2 92696.87 92689.65 125455.1 125411.3 125954.8 125902.6
BIC 129972.9 92909.67 92902.45 125667.9 125624.1 126167.6 126115.3
(5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Income
Occasional political discussions
No political discussions
Constant
Age 55-64
Age 65+
Middle education
Upper education
Chief wage earner
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Age 45-54
Min GDP growth last 5 years
Max demonstrations last 5 years
Inflation targeting country
Female
Maximum inflation -                        
10th decile
Number of demonstrations
Hyperinflation
Max inflation last 5 years
Maximum inflation -                        
6th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
7th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
8th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
9th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
2nd decile
Maximum inflation -                        
3rd decile
Maximum inflation -                        
4th decile
Maximum inflation -                        
5th decile
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Table A2: Determinants of survey responses, EU versus non-EU countries 
Past experience
0.853 *** 0.918 *** 0.944 ** 0.892 *** 0.888 *** 0.888 **
(0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.036) (0.048)
1.071 *** 1.039 ** 1.069 *** 0.984 0.994 1.008
(0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.027) (0.038)
0.700 ** 0.502 *** 0.624 0.839 *** 0.631 *** 0.736 *
(0.115) (0.104) (0.217) (0.032) (0.040) (0.117)
Current conditions
1.947 0.033 * 0.002 *** 0.588 *** 0.635 * 1.264
(2.887) (0.059) (0.003) (0.118) (0.167) (0.262)
7.079 0.001 ** 0.000 *** 19.194 0.086 442.429 **
(14.200) (0.002) (0.001) (82.451) (0.440) 1096.223)
1.073 ** 1.029 0.974 1.105 *** 1.017 1.074
(0.035) (0.034) (0.059) (0.030) (0.049) (0.076)
1.711 *** 1.031 0.853 0.162 *** 0.826 1.873 ***
(0.291) (0.185) (0.143) (0.018) (0.139) (0.398)
Demographics
0.782 *** 0.852 ** 0.793 *** 0.899 0.872 0.800
(0.034) (0.057) (0.050) (0.090) (0.103) (0.111)
1.107 * 1.086 * 1.150 *** 1.016 0.979 1.084
(0.059) (0.054) (0.045) (0.086) (0.076) (0.115)
1.108 0.967 0.719 *** 1.218 1.322 * 1.028
(0.101) (0.083) (0.075) (0.219) (0.210) (0.241)
1.146 0.860 0.604 *** 1.368 * 1.255 0.918
(0.106) (0.079) (0.076) (0.240) (0.187) (0.238)
1.365 *** 0.864 0.593 *** 1.646 ** 1.303 1.178
(0.137) (0.090) (0.089) (0.346) (0.253) (0.312)
1.533 *** 0.732 ** 0.535 *** 2.111 *** 1.263 ** 1.162
(0.150) (0.099) (0.078) (0.251) (0.125) (0.260)
1.995 *** 0.685 *** 0.558 *** 2.518 *** 1.157 1.002
(0.250) (0.100) (0.092) (0.336) (0.150) (0.289)
1.305 *** 1.759 *** 2.042 *** 1.129 1.421 *** 1.447 ***
(0.080) (0.143) (0.150) (0.092) (0.125) (0.152)
1.535 *** 2.525 *** 3.691 *** 1.328 *** 1.785 *** 2.596 ***
(0.192) (0.300) (0.461) (0.104) (0.178) (0.472)
1.023 ** 1.094 *** 1.064 *** 1.079 *** 1.030 *** 0.986
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.021)
Role of politics
1.135 *** 0.918 *** 0.958 ** 1.118 *** 0.905 *** 0.935 ***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.027) (0.012)
1.041 0.684 *** 0.676 *** 0.946 0.532 *** 0.534 ***
(0.062) (0.046) (0.046) (0.075) (0.043) (0.047)
0.873 0.439 *** 0.456 *** 0.780 *** 0.357 *** 0.291 ***
(0.081) (0.059) (0.060) (0.075) (0.033) (0.051)
1.828 *** 5.689 *** 2.650 *** 6.889 *** 18.774 *** 6.867 ***
(0.255) (1.473) (0.627) (2.103) (8.517) (3.595)
Country fixed effects
Wave fixed effects
Country-wave fixed effects
Number of observations
McFadden's Adj R2
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2
AIC
BIC
Maximum inflation
Hyperinflation
Max inflation last 5 years
Min GDP growth last 5 years
Number of demonstrations
No political discussions
Constant
Max demonstrations last 5 years
Inflation targeting country
Female
Chief wage earner
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Political self-positioning
Occasional political discussions
Age 45-54
Age 55-64
Age 65+
Middle education
Upper education
Income
YES
NO
NO
37065
0.083
0.221
90105
90241
Order vs 
Inflation
European Union Countries Non-European Union Countries
Order vs 
Inflation
Say vs 
Inflation
Free speech 
vs Infl. 
Say vs 
Inflation
Free speech 
vs Infl. 
YES
NO
NO
15330
0.090
0.234
35791
35844  
Note: See notes to table 4. Sample is split into European Union countries (left panel) and non-European Union 
countries (right panel).  39
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